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If  You’re Quasi-Explaning, You’re Quasi-Losing  1
NOTE: This is the penultimate draft, accepted for publication in Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics. Please quote or cite from the published version.
The giving and requesting of  explanations is central to normative practice. When we 
tell children that they must act in certain ways, they often ask why, and often we are 
able to answer them. Sentences like ‘Kicking dogs is wrong because it hurts them’, 
and ‘You should eat your vegetables because they’re healthy’, are meaningful and 
ubiquitous.  
In a recent (2020) paper, Selim Berker shows that these kinds of  explanations present 
a challenge for expressivism. If  the expressivist is to avoid advocating an extremely 
revisionary theory of  normative discourse, she must be able to tell us what normative 
‘because’-statements mean. This means, according to Berker, there must be an 
expressivist account of  normative grounding. 
But why grounding? Berker offers an argument from exhaustion. The ‘because’ is 
obviously not causal. Blackburn (1993: 152-54; 172-74) claims it expresses a relation 
of  counterfactual dependence. ‘Lying is wrong because it treats people as means’ tells 
us that if  lying did not treat people as means it would not be wrong. But, Berker 
objects, this fails to capture the asymmetry of  explanation (forthcoming: section 1). A 
Kantian thinks an act is wrong if  and only if  it treats people as mere means. But then 
she must agree with ‘If  lying were not wrong, it would not treat people as mere 
means’. But then she would have to accept, ‘Lying treats others as mere means 
because it is wrong’. 
Berker concludes ‘because’ in these cases expresses an asymmetric explanatory 
relation, a kind of  grounding relation. But this presents a special challenge to 
expressivists. Expressivists are committed to understanding apparently realistic 
aspects of  normative discourse in terms of  the states of  mind we express in making 
normative claims. What state of  mind are we expressing when we make these claims 
about normative grounding? 
Berker proposes, on behalf  of  the expressivist, that these claims express basing 
relations among our mental states (199ff.). Let’s say that ‘Lying is wrong’ expresses 
disapproval of  lying. In that case, ‘Lying is wrong because it treats people as mere 
means’ expresses being in a state in which one’s disapproval of  lying is based on one’s 
belief  that lying treats people as mere means. Basing, here, is roughly what Davidson 
called rationalizing (1963). The belief  causes the disapproval: but it doesn’t merely 
cause it, it also contributes to the disapproval’s agential intelligibility, rational 
coherence, and so on. As Berker notes, an advantage of  this account is that it can be 
combined with numerous existing expressivist semantics. If  we are Blackburnians, we 
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will say that it is disapproval of  lying that is based on the belief  that it treats people as 
mere means. If  we are Gibbardians, we can say instead that it is a plan to get angry 
about lying that is based on the belief. 
Nevertheless, the account can’t work. Normative reasoning is typically abductive. We 
come to accept big moral principles such as ‘It is wrong to treat people as mere 
means’ or ‘It is wrong to fail to maximise happiness’ because these seem to explain 
why many of  the things we antecedently judged wrong are wrong. These principles 
predict that lying, murder, theft, promise-breaking, and so on are wrong, at least in 
normal cases; and if  they didn’t do that we would not accept the big principle. But 
this means that my disapproval of  treating people as mere means is partly based on 
my disapproval of  lying. So I should accept, ‘Treating people as mere means is wrong 
because lying is wrong’. This gets Kantian explanatory commitments backwards. 
Generalizing, when we reason abductively, the basing relation among our attitudes 
will be the reverse of  our explanatory commitments. 
There is also a big-picture worry that is in some ways more important: Berker’s 
strategy is the wrong kind for the expressivist to pursue. The datum to be explained is 
that we make a certain kind of  ‘because’ claim. ‘Lying is wrong because it misleads 
people’. ‘Misleading people is wrong because it treats them like mere means’. The 
expressivist should not first identify some explanatory relation denoted by ‘because’, 
then try to give an expressivist reinterpretation of  that relation. This is not how 
expressivists have handled truth, for example. They do not first say that ‘true’ denotes 
a property, then try to give a more antirealist friendly interpretation of  that property. 
Rather, they adopt the deflationist strategy: they look to the uses of  the predicate 
‘true’, as a device for disquotation, indirect assertion, and generalization. These uses 
are supposed ultimately to exhaust the meaning ‘true’ (e.g. Dreier 2004). 
Similarly, the expressivist should start by looking to our practices of  providing 
explanations, of  using explanatory speech acts to communicate. This suggests that 
expressivists should not look in the first instance at metaphysicians’ accounts of  
noncausal explanation, but rather to “pragmatic” accounts of  explanation in the 
philosophy of  science (e.g., van Fraasen 1980, chapter 5; Achinstein 1983).  The 2
specific model I will propose comes from Marc Lange (2017), who appeals to the 
pragmatic aspects of  explanation—the way in which our interests and background 
knowledge affect what strikes us as explanatory—to account for noncausal 
explanations in mathematics. In brief, Lange argues that some mathematical proofs 
are explanatory, while others are not, because they utilize premises that answer to our 
interests in what is proved. This will be my model for another kind of  noncausal 
explanation, normative explanation. 
This will solve Berker’s challenge for the expressivist. But it does more. It allows the 
expressivist to stake out a genuine metaphysical difference between those properties 
about which she is a realist and those about which she is a quasirealist—not simply a 
difference, as is standard, in our theories about how language and thought relate to 
these properties. In short, it allows for a new kind of  solution, a distinctively 
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metaphysical solution, to the problem of  creeping minimalism (Dreier 2004 and 2018). 
We are genuine realists about those properties that stand somewhere in the hierarchy 
of  fundamentality. The real properties are the properties that ground or are grounded 
by other properties. Quasireal properties stand outside this hierarchy. They neither 
ground nor are grounded by anything. To explain these properties is not to identify 
any objective relation of  metaphysical dependence, but to provide information that 
answers to our interests—primarily practical interests—in the domain.  3
This characterization of  the quasireal seems to follow from how expressivism is 
standardly understood. The expressivist denies that normative properties reduce to or 
can be realized by the natural. She also denies that there is a sui generis relation of  
metaphysical determination between the natural and the normative. The normative, 
then, isn’t grounded in any familiar way at all—whether grounding is a single unitary 
relation, or a placeholder for several different relations of  metaphysical dependence, 
including reduction, realization, composition, etc. (e.g., Wilson 2014). 
I will start with a case of  explanations that expressivists should deny involve any 
objective metaphysical relations: explanations involving imperatives. I will then 
propose that these should be understood as explaining by generalizing. This will lead 
to a discussion of  Lange’s work on unifying explanations in mathematics. My 
proposal will be that the standard form of  a normative explanation is a unifying 
generalization, one which explains by presenting a more particular normative 
injunction as a special case of  a more general injunction. This kind of  explanation 
creates no special problems for the expressivist, beyond the already familiar question 
of  accounting for relations of  logical consequence.  4
1. Explaining Orders 
Notice that imperatives can be conjoined with ‘because’-clauses: 
(a) Louise, go to your room, because you told your brother to shut up!  5
(b) Forgive others, not because they deserve forgiveness, but because you deserve 
peace.  6
(c) Donate blood, because reserves are low.  7
This is not a causal ‘because’. It is also not a ‘because’ of  grounding. Grounding is a 
relation between facts, and imperatives, however exactly we should think of  their 
content, do not purport to communicate facts: they do not tell us what the world is 
like. Rather, they tell us what to do. 
 David Enoch suggests that would be a position for the quasirealist to explore at the end of  his 3
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Or at least this is what expressivists will say. Imperatives may actually be disguised 
deontic modals—‘Go to your room!’ elliptical for ‘You must go to your room!’  But 8
expressivists are under pressure to resist that analysis. Imperatives have long been 
used by expressivists as examples of  sentences that are not truth-apt but still have 
logical structure (Hare 1952; and Charlow 2014a and -b). It helps even more that they 
direct us to do things, as normative claims typically do. It has been a standard strategy 
to analyze a normative claim as something like an imperative but with additional 
logical structure (e.g., Hare 1952; and Alwood 2016). For an expressivist to concede 
that they are really disguised modal claims is to give up a key piece of  evidence in 
expressivism’s favor, a key example of  a speech act with the distinctive features 
expressivists associate with normative claims. 
Fortunately, there are reasons to reject the modal analysis. As Nate Charlow puts it: 
“Such accounts face a major difficulty: explaining why, if  an imperative’s semantic 
value is such an entity, its use is performative (requirement-creating), rather than 
representational” (2014a). Imperatives cannot express assertions (Charlow 2014b). 
And as William Starr (2018) points out, the following are not equivalent in meaning: 
(d) Invest in this company and you’ll be rich. 
(e) You must invest in this company and you’ll be rich. 
The expressivist thus has grounds for insisting that imperatives provide an example 
of  a distinctive, nonfactual, nonrepresentational semantic value. What’s more, unlike 
normative statements, which have the surface form of  representational sentences, 
imperatives wear this distinctive semantic function on their face. They do not even 
state facts or states of  affairs in some deflationary sense. Yet here they are, attached 
to ‘because’ clauses. 
I propose that these ‘because’-claims are instances of  explanation by generalization. 
2. Explanation by Generalization 
Are generalizations explanatory? Or are general truths rather explained by their 
instances? If  we are talking about relations of  objective determination, I do not 
know. Perhaps general truths are explained by instances. Fortunately, I don’t have to 
answer this. I’m concerned with explanatory speech acts. And we provide explanations 
by means of  generalization all the time. 
(f) Why did Bob get laid off? Because everyone in that department got laid off. 
(g) Why aren’t there any unicorns in this forest? Because unicorns don’t exist. 
(h) Why does 2+2=4? Because it couldn’t equal anything but 4. 
Each explanation shows how some particular truth is an instance of  a more general 
one. How is this explanatory? Think about the kind of  explanatory information it 
provides us with: there is nothing special about the particular case. There is nothing 
special about this forest: unicorns are not to be found anywhere. There is nothing 
 See (Charlow 2014b) for overview of  the debate.8
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special about the particular arrangement of  our universe: 2+2 would still equal 4 
however things were arranged. 
David Lewis’s (1984) discussion of  causal explanations is helpful here. An event is 
explained, for Lewis, by its causal history. Explanatory speech acts provide 
information about that causal history. The information can be more or less precise, 
detailed, disjunctive, and so on. What kind of  information we provide will depend on 
our epistemic situation, that of  our interlocutors, what is relevant to our interests, and 
so on (217ff.).  Given this, we can say (f) tells us that the cause of  Bob’s being laid 9
off  is whatever caused his entire department to be laid off. Given certain concerns—
is he a competent worker?—that information may be all that we want.  10
If  we accept grounding explanations as another sort of  explanation, in addition to 
the causal, we should generalize on Lewis, in the manner sketched in (Väyrynen 2006: 
294ff; and Dasgupta 2017: 90-91). We can explain by providing information—more 
or less specific, detailed, etc—about determination relations, either causal relations or 
relations of  metaphysical dependence. (h) plausibly tells us that if  anything grounds 
the fact that 2+2=4, then whatever it is must be a necessary truth. Not much 
information, but given certain interests, it may be plenty. 
My proposal is that imperatival explanations are similarly based on generalizations. 
But these generalizations—unlike (f), say—do not provide any information about an 
objective determination relation, because imperatives do not stand in such relations. 
Rather, ‘Louise, go to your room because you told your brother to shut up’, explains 
by implying a more general command from which the specific command to go to 
one’s room follows. For example, ‘Go to your room whenever you tell a family 
member to shut up’. The more general command is implied by being the command 
which, in conjunction with you told your brother to shut up, would entail go to your room.  11
Why think that imperatives are explained by means of  generalization? Partly because 
there are so few relations they can fit into. Causation and grounding were already 
ruled out. Fortunately, imperatives also have logical structure (this is part of  what 
gives expressivists hope). If  the explanations are implied generalizations, the relation 
between the imperative and what’s denoted by the ‘because’ clause is one of  logical 
consequence given a hidden background premise. 
 See (Bontly 2005 and Klein 2014) for further examples of  pragmatic effects on causal 9
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But if  these explanations don’t provide information about an objective determination 
relation, how are they explanatory? By answering to our informational interests. 
Sentences like (f) - (g) subsume a particular prescription to a more general one. They 
instruct us not to treat some particular as special, but rather to perform a more 
specific act or set of  acts as a way of  satisfying a more general policy. There’s nothing 
special happening now—go to your room whenever you tell your brother to shut up. 
There’s nothing special about forgiveness—do those things that bring you peace. 
This will be my model for normative explanation. ‘Lying is wrong because it treats 
people as mere means’ tells us that the prohibition on lying follows from the more 
general prohibition on treating people as mere means. 
The relation between the specific command and the general is one of  entailment on 
my account. Similarly, I will say the relation between the more specific and more 
general prohibition is one of  entailment. But it is a standard dogma of  these debates 
that entailment cannot be explanatory. This dogma is mistaken. 
3. Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics 
The dogma goes like this. Entailment cannot be explanatory. After all, the existence 
of  Socrates entails the existence of  the singleton set of  Socrates, but the existence of  
the singleton set of  Socrates also entails the existence of  Socrates. But that would 
mean that explanation in this case is circular. Explanation is an asymmetric relation, 
but entailment is not. Or we may point instead to the fact that explanation is non-
monotonic.  The existence of  Socrates and the existence of  Alcibiades entails 12
existence of  the singleton set of  Socrates, but it is false that the singleton set of  
Socrates exists because Socrates exists and Alcibiades exists. 
These arguments don’t work. As David Kovacs points out, it relies on the assumption 
that if  a relation is sometimes explanatory, it must always be explanatory (2017: 
2936-38). Kovacs provides multiple reasons to reject this assumption (ibid.). For the 
current discussion the following will be sufficient: some mathematical proofs are 
deemed inferior by mathematicians because they fail to explain what they prove, 
whereas others are deemed superior for being explanatory (Kitcher 1989; Lange 2017 
and 2019). But mathematical proofs prove their conclusions by being deductive 
arguments for them. So premises that entail a conclusion sometimes explain that 
conclusion and sometimes they do not. 
Why are some entailments explanatory and others not? I will here turn to Lange. He 
argues that proofs can be explanatory in virtue of  a number of  properties they might 
have—symmetry, simplicity, or unity, for example (2017). What makes these different 
proofs explanatory? Lange’s explanation is that explanatory proofs utilize a premise 
that displays the same kind of  striking or salient feature we see in the result: 
At least in many cases, what it means to ask for proof  that explains is 
to ask for a proof  that exploits a certain kind of  feature of  the setup
 Thanks to Selim Berker for pressing me on this issue.12
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—the same kind of  feature that is outstanding (i.e., salient) in the 
result. (255) 
In other words, a symmetrical proof  is explanatory when the result proved displays a 
striking symmetry. We explain this striking symmetry in the result by utilizing a 
premise that has the same kind of  symmetry (234ff.). Likewise for properties such as 
simplicity and unity, when these properties make a proof  explanatory. To illustrate the 
idea further, I will present Lange’s first example of  a unifying proof  (276ff.), both 
because the math is simple and because it will provide my model of  the canonical 
form of  a normative explanation. 
There are certain numbers called calculator numbers. One forms them by starting at 
one corner, then typing across, down, or diagonally, and then typing back in the other 
direction. For example, starting at the lower left corner and typing across one would 
type 1... 2... 3... and then back again, 3... 2... 1.  One repeats this process at each of  
the four corners, and for the four numbers that make the edges of  the calculator face. 
The result is sixteen calculator numbers in total: 
123321, 147741, 159951, 258852, 321123, 369963, ..., 951159, 987789. 
Each of  these calculator numbers is divisible by 37. There is a simple proof  of  this 
that is clearly not explanatory. We could simply list out each of  the calculator 
numbers, say there are no other calculator numbers, then take each number and 
divide it by 37 (276). Such a proof  would leave one still wondering why each 
calculator number is divisible by 37. 
The following proof, by contrast, is explanatory. Each calculator number must be an 
instance of  the following formula:  
a*105+(a+d)104+(a+2d)103+(a+2d)102+(a+d)10+a. 
And: 
a*105+(a+d)104+(a+2d)103+(a+2d)102+(a+d)10+a = 111111a+12210d = 
1221(91a+10d) 
And: 
1221 = 37*33 
This is what Lange means by a setup that exploits the same kind of  unity we see in 
the result. The explanatory proof  explains why it is that all calculator numbers have a 
certain property (being divisible by 37), by identifying another property they must all 
have in common (being instances of  a*105+(a+d)104+(a+2d)103+(a+2d)102+
(a+d)10+a), and deriving the first common property from the second. This is an 
example of  a deductive argument that is explanatory, even though not all deductive 
arguments are explanatory. 
But might explanatory proofs implicitly invoke grounds as premises? It doesn’t seem 
so. First, it would seem that the non-explanatory proof  does cite the grounds as 
premises: intuitively, the fact that all calculator numbers are divisible by 37 is 
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grounded in the fact that 123321 is divisible by 37, and that 159951 is divisible by 37, 
etc (Lange 2019: 2). What’s more, the individual mathematical facts are not intuitively 
explained by the property that explains the general fact. That is, the fact that 123321 
is an instance of  a*105+(a+d)104+(a+2d)103+(a+2d)102+(a+d)10+a does not explain 
why 123321 is divisible by 37. In fact, it’s not clear that anything explains 123321 
being divisible by 37 (Lange 2017: 279). If  someone asked you ‘Why is 123321 
divisible by 37?’ it would be, outside of  some further context, unclear what they were 
asking for. But if  being instances of  a*105+(a+d)104+(a+2d)103+(a+2d)102+
(a+d)10+a grounded all of  the calculator numbers being divisible by 37, it should be 
the grounds of  any individual calculator number being divisible by 37.  13
For Lange, the reason some entailments are explanatory and others not clearly rests 
on pragmatic concerns (see especially 308ff.). The unity of  the result calls for an 
explanation because it is, in his words, “salient.” It would be very strange if  it turned 
out to be a coincidence that all calculator numbers are divisible by 37. So we want a 
proof  that shows how this striking common property follows from another common 
property the calculator numbers must share. This accounts for why the property—
being an instance of  a*105+(a+d)104+(a+2d)103+(a+2d)102+(a+d)10+a—explains 
the general result and not the particular. When we ask, ‘Why is each calculator 
number divisible by 37?’ it is obvious what kind of  information we are after, what we 
find salient. We want information from which a commonality follows. But the 
question ‘Why is 123321 divisible by 37?’ is opaque without further background, and 
so the same information is not explanatory. 
The expressivist should similarly appeal to pragmatic aspects of  explanation. Our 
interest in normative discourse leads to a general interest in unifying information. 
The question ‘Why is lying wrong?’ is standardly understood as a request for more 
general principles, or so I will argue. 
4. The Theory 
“Euthyphro” is often taken as one of  the classic statements of  a request for 
asymmetrical grounds in explanation. What is more fundamental, being god-beloved 
or being pious? However, it is worth noting that the initial problem Socrates presents 
to Euthyphro looks much more like a request for a unifying explanation. Socrates 
asks Euthyphro “what is the pious,” and Euthyphro responds, “To prosecute the 
wrongdoer” (Plato, 5). Socrates responds by first pointing out that there are many 
kinds of  pious actions, and then says, “…I did not bid you tell me one or two of  the 
many pious actions but that form itself  that makes all pious actions pious” (6). 
Euthyphro explained why calculator numbers are divisible by 37 by dividing 321123. 
Socrates wants a unifying explanation, a property that all the pious acts have in 
common from which their piety follows. Of  course, Socrates finds Euthyphro’s 
unifying answer dissatisfying as well, and so the need for asymmetric determinations 
gets rolling. But let’s start with the value of  unifying explanations of  the normative, 
and deal with asymmetry later. 
 Lange gives a host of  other reasons, along with further examples and arguments, to show that 13
many cases of  mathematical explanation cannot be grounding explanations (2019).
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Why do we want such explanations? In the mathematical case, there is simply a 
striking unity. There can be something similar in the normative case. Why is 
prosecuting murderers on the same list as praying to and sacrificing to the gods? 
That’s unexpected. 
But even when the unity is not particularly striking we still want unifying 
explanations. Why? Socrates has a good explanation ready: “Tell me then what this 
form itself  is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action 
of  yours or another’s that is of  that kind is pious, and if  it is not that it is not” (ibid.).  
But why do we need something to use as a model? Here’s the expressivist answer. 
Normative terms, ‘piety’ or ‘wrong’, function to coordinate our actions and attitudes. 
They express commitments to respond in certain ways. We need a model in order to 
say what it is that we’ve committed to responding to. A mere list of  examples will 
always be finite, and hence potentially incomplete. A model allows us to say whether 
novel acts are pious.  
And Socrates wants a model that applies to actions “whether yours or another’s.” 
Human nature is such that we make exceptions of  ourselves and judge strangers’ 
behavior more harshly than friends’. So long as our normative commitments are 
unprincipled, there is greater risk that our judgments on cases are post hoc justifications 
of  unreflective prejudice, or the product of  self-serving loopholes (McKeever and 
Ridge 2006: Chapter 8).  Or, even if  they are not, other people, familiar as they are 14
with humanity, are more likely to suspect these loopholes are at play. Sure, Euthyphro, 
prosecuting your own dad is just like praying. 
Lange’s view is that sometimes proofs are explanatory when they are unifying, 
because sometimes it is unity that is salient to us. Adapting this to the normative case, 
I think that the case of  Socrates and Euthyphro gives reason to think normative 
principles are always or nearly always explanatory when they are unifying, because our 
interests in normative discourse ensure that unity is always salient. 
Why? Again, start with an expressivist-friendly account of  the purpose of  normative 
discourse: to serve social coordination, by coordinating our acts, thoughts, and 
feelings. Unifying principles support these aims. They help secure agreement not just 
on a list of  cases, but over a potentially wide range of  novel cases. It is easier to 
remember and teach to others than a disjunctive list of  what falls under a normative 
term’s extension (‘It is wrong to lie, or kill, or steal, or break a promise, or...’). And it 
creates confidence that a normative sensibility is not tailor-made to a particular 
person or group’s benefit and prejudice, by means of  ad hoc exceptions or additions. 
A normative explanation, then, is a premise which, possibly in conjunction with 
implicit background premises, entails the conclusion, by identifying a common property of  
the objects the conclusion is about. The canonical ‘because’ claims in normative 
explanations are of  one of  two related forms. In the case where we explain why some 
singular entity has a normative property, they take the form: 
 Though McKeever and Ridge also point out that intermediary principles will sometimes be 14
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 a is N because a is G. 
And when they explain why all members of  some class have a normative property 
they take the form: 
 Fs are Ns because Fs are Gs. 
In these statements the explanans is a premise to an implicit argument to which the 
explanandum is a conclusion. Context and basic facts about what’s needed for the 
conclusion to follow will determine the remaining, unspoken premises. They will 
generally be Gs are Ns, or Gs are Ns, all else being equal along with the premise All else is 
equal. 
Like imperatival explanations, these subsume specific prescriptions to more general 
ones. ‘Lying is wrong because it treats people as mere means’ explains the prohibition 
on lying by telling us that it follows from the more general prohibition on treating 
people as mere means. 
Also like the account of  imperatival explanations, the account here tells us that 
‘because’ expresses a relation of  entailment from a premise that unifies our normative 
commitments. This is an advantage to the proposal: it is ecumenical between different 
expressivist theories. Those who have been waiting to hear what state of  mind is 
expressed by the ‘because’ claim will be disappointed. I have no specific account of  
that. But one isn’t needed. The normative ‘because’ is used to communicate a 
deductive argument. ‘Lying is wrong because it treats people as mere means’ thus 
communicates something like: 
1. Lying treats people as mere means. 
2. Any act that treats people as mere means is wrong. (implied premise) 
3. Therefore, lying is wrong. 
The state of  mind expressed is whatever state of  mind would be expressed by 
making the above argument. Plug in whatever expressivist theory you like for that. 
Of  course, the expressivist needs to be able to account for quantification, 
conditionals, and entailment. But expressivists already owed an account of  that. If  
expressivists can solve the Frege-Geach Problem, they can account for the normative 
‘because’. 
As noted, the implied premises may include ceteris paribus clauses or the fact that all 
else really is equal. This is important if  we are to account for actual normative 
discourse. Many normative explanations given in everyday life cite prima facie or pro 
tanto principles rather than exceptionless ones. E.g., ‘Hot-wiring a car is wrong 
because it is stealing’. We would not assume someone who gives such an explanation 
must believe stealing is always wrong, even to save a life. 
Another feature of  actual normative discourse should be noted. While normative 
explanations in the context of  philosophy often take the form of  ‘Lying is wrong 
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because it treats people as mere means’, or ‘Lying is (generally) wrong because it 
(generally) fails to maximize happiness’, explanations citing these kinds of  ultimate 
principles are uncommon elsewhere. Much more typical are explanations like: 
Because it misleads others. 
Because you wouldn’t like it if  people lied to you. 
These explanations can also be appropriate—even more appropriate than an 
explanation citing Kantian or utilitarian principles, given the right background 
context. Why? Perhaps I am a Kantian and you are a utilitarian, but even if  we 
disagree about ultimate principles, we can still find agreement on intermediary ones. 
Any plausible moral theory will tell us that misleading others and doing unto others 
what you would not have them do unto you are wrong, or at least wrong, ceteris 
paribus. Rather than getting sucked into an interminable debate on abstract issues, we 
can quickly establish agreement over a wide range of  cases through a still relatively 
principled ethics, and limit disagreement to the marginal situations in which ceteris non 
paribus.  15
4.1. Explaining Asymmetry? 
But what about the asymmetry that initially motivated Berker? Why isn’t the Kantian 
also committed to ‘Lying treats people as mere means because it is wrong’? And what 
about non-monotonicity? How does one avoid commitment to ‘That act was wrong 
because it is lying on a Tuesday’?  16
I will start with non-monotonicity because it is the easier case. The first thing to note 
is that explaining why the sentence ‘That act was wrong because it is lying on a 
Tuesday’ is unacceptable is a problem for everyone. Advocates of  normative 
grounding do not escape it simply by saying that grounding is a non-monotonic 
relation. As noted above, most of  our real life normative explanations do not cite the 
ultimate normative principles, but intermediary principles, which have the virtue of  
being less contentious. For the grounding theorist, this means that we rarely cite in a 
direct way the actual grounds of  an action’s wrongness when explaining why it is 
wrong. This is not an objection to the grounding account. As also noted earlier, the 
grounding theorist can appeal to the generalized version of  Lewis’s account of  
explanation. Just as the causal explanations we provide present some information 
about the cause, but of  more or less detail, directness, and so on, an explanation such 
as ‘That act was wrong because it was lying’ provides information about the grounds 
of  the act’s wrongness, but in indirect form. It tells us the act is wrong in virtue of  
whatever property is (ceteris paribus) shared by acts of  lying, in virtue of  which they are 
(ceteris paribus) wrong. But if  lying is wrong, then a further intermediary principle is 
that lying on Tuesday is wrong. Lying on Tuesday will possess whatever property it is 
that grounds wrongness. So why can’t we cite lying on Tuesday as an explanans? 
 Also, as Walden notes, these kinds of  explanations may identify considerations that are more 15
epistemically tractable and easier to use in deliberation (196ff.).
 Thanks to Selim Berker for this example.16
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As Lewis (1984) and Dasgupta (2017) both note, the kind of  explanatory information 
we provide will depend on the pragmatics of  communication generally. But then we 
have an explanation of  why ‘That act is wrong because it’s lying on a Tuesday’ will be 
unacceptable—because it is hard to imagine cases in which being Tuesday is salient to 
our interests in social coordination or our epistemic position. But I can appeal to the 
same thing. Salience is supposed to distinguish explanatory from non-explanatory 
cases of  entailment. 
Evidence that the issue is a pragmatic one is provided by imagined cases where ‘That 
act is wrong because it is lying on a Tuesday’ would be a fine explanation. Let’s say 
you’ve been trying to teach Bill that some acts, such as drinking, smoking, and 
cussing, are wrong on the Sabbath but okay otherwise. You catch him lying and tell 
him what he did was wrong. “But it’s a Tuesday!” he replies. Realizing his mistake you 
answer, “It’s wrong because it’s lying on a Tuesday.” Or let’s say you live in a 
community where many of  your neighbors think it is okay to lie on most days, but 
that Tuesday is the designated truth day. You are trying to get people in the town to 
agree that the mayor has behaved badly. Knowing your neighbors’ strange moral 
views, you focus on the following: “We can at least agree that what he did was wrong 
because it was lying on a Tuesday.” Of  course, it seems more natural to choose 
language that indicates that you aren’t entirely happy with this explanation (‘We can at 
least agree that…’), but this is not unfamiliar in normative discussion. I might say to 
more authoritarian fellow citizens, “We can at least agree that torture is wrong 
because it puts our own troops at risk.” When we must coordinate with those whose 
moral views we find distasteful, we look for ways to indicate that we think there are 
further normative considerations that are relevant, but that we won’t, in this context, 
treat failure to acknowledge them as a deal-breaker. 
Asymmetry is a bit harder, but still ultimately depends on our interests in kinds of  
explanatory information. Let’s review how things are supposed to work. Explanations 
provide information relevant to our interests and epistemic situation. What counts as 
an explanation will thus vary with the explanandum. When I ask why all calculator 
numbers are divisible by 37, typically what I want is a more obvious common 
property from which the surprising one is derived. But if  I ask why 123321 is 
divisible by 37, it is unclear what information I am looking for. What explains the 
general case will not be explanatory for the particular, because what interests us 
differs. 
Consider ‘Lying is wrong because it treats people as mere means’. Here the 
explanandum is normative. What we are after here is a more general principle under 
which to subsume the more specific verdict, because that supports our interests in 
social coordination. We are not after a grounding explanation. Knowledge of  
objective metaphysical dependencies is not in any obvious way relevant to our 
practical interests in the normative. What’s more, since normative properties are 
quasireal, they can’t stand in such relations. So we aren’t interested in, or asking about, 
those. 
‘Lying treats people as mere means because it is wrong’, by contrast, has a 
nonnormative explanandum. By changing the kind of  explanandum, we change the kind 
of  information we are standardly after. In this case, what we would typically want is 
 13
information about the explanandum’s cause or its grounds. ‘Why does lying treat people 
as mere means?’ is most naturally interpreted as asking what it is to treat someone as 
mere means. It thus asks for information about what grounds the fact that lying treats 
others as mere means. (A good answer might be: ‘Because lying takes away from 
others the ability to make an informed choice’.) But then my theory has a 
straightforward explanation why ‘lying treats people as mere means because it is 
wrong’ is unacceptable in most contexts. Interpreted as a claim about grounds, the 
answer is false. Normative properties, being quasireal, cannot ground anything. 
Interpreted as a claim about entailment, on the other hand, it fails to answer the 
correct why-question. We were asking about grounds. 
So the metaphysical distinction between real and quasireal properties can do real 
work vindicating our intuitions about the acceptability of  certain ‘because’ statements 
and accounting for the apparent asymmetry in normative explanations. 
I say “apparent” because the asymmetry is ultimately based on interests, epistemic 
situation, and context. There can be cases, then, in which ‘Lying treats people as mere 
means because it is wrong’ is acceptable, cases in which our interests and background 
knowledge are atypical. If  this sounds surprising, keep in mind that ‘The fire is to the 
north because that’s where the smoke is coming from’ is acceptable in some contexts, 
as is ‘The earth is getting warmer because all the scientists say that it is’.  Let’s say we 17
both know that God has given me a list of  all the wrong acts, and He also told us 
both that acts are wrong if  and only if  they treat people as mere means. I tell you 
lying treats others as mere means. You ask me why. I say, ‘Because it’s wrong!’ 
4.2. Really Explaining 
One might worry that this use of  ‘because’ is merely evidential. It doesn’t strike us as 
genuinely explanatory. That’s fine. Again, what will strike us as genuinely explanatory 
will vary to some degree with the explanandum. If  the explanandum is fire to north of  
us, or an act treating someone as mere means, genuine explanation requires 
information about the cause or the grounds. Otherwise it feels like the explanans bears 
a merely evidential relation to the explanandum. 
But consider the following ‘because’-claims: 
(i) Lying is wrong because my mother told me it’s wrong. 
(j) What Charlie Brown just did is the wrong thing because Charlie Brown 
always does the wrong thing. 
These also seem evidential. They feel much more like ‘The fire is to the north 
because that’s where the smoke is coming from’ than ‘The fire is to the north because 
someone dropped a match’. But they have the canonical form of  a normative 
explanation. And the explanandum is normative, so we can’t appeal to the need for 
information about objective determination relations before the explanation will feel 
real. 
 I owe this example and the next to Jamie Dreier.17
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We need to show instead how the pragmatic concerns invoked can account for why 
some normative explanations would strike us as genuinely explanatory, and others 
not. To do so, I want to identify two ways in which these explanations are deficient to 
the end of  promoting social coordination. 
First, (i) and (j) don’t help us to reach agreement on novel cases. If  my mom hasn’t 
commented on it, if  Charlie Brown never did it, it doesn’t help us deal with the 
unfamiliar. One of  the points of  offering normative explanations, or imperatival 
explanations for that matter, was to give information about how to proceed in a wider 
range of  new cases. But these ‘because’-claims will contribute only minimally to that. 
Of  course, we might offer counterfactual versions of  these principles. ‘Doxxing is 
wrong because it’s the sort of  thing my mother, rest in peace, would call wrong’. 
WWCB~D (What Would Charlie Brown Not Do). 
Before moving on, we should note that these are intermediary principles of  a sort. 
Nonetheless, they suffer from a deficiency as principles: they are extremely sectional, 
whether in their original or counterfactual forms. They only help secure agreement 
on new cases among those who know my mom really well, or among those who 
know Peanuts really well. (And “get” them: I find Peanuts pretty much 
incomprehensible.) 
These deficiencies noted, here is my proposal: some normative explanations seem 
more genuinely explanatory because they contribute to understanding, whereas others 
do not. The failure to provide their audience with normative understanding, then, 
leads to our sense that they aren’t real explanations. 
What is normative understanding? This is an enormous issue, well outside the scope 
of  this paper.  But for my purposes it will do to identify what expressivists should 18
insist on as a minimal core of  such understanding. It cannot be characterized in terms 
of  explanatory knowledge (e.g., Sliwa 2017), nor can it be characterized in terms of  
an ability to give explanations (e.g., Hills 2009), both on pain of  circularity. More to 
the expressivist’s purposes would be a pragmatic characterization of  understanding, 
as a kind of  discursive know-how. This kind of  understanding will answer to our 
basic concern with social coordination. 
Such practical understanding would first involve the ability to correctly apply 
normative predicates to novel cases, without the guidance or assistance of  another 
expert (or rule book, or Google). Without this ability, one cannot claim an 
independent understanding of  the normative notions in question. In keeping with the 
practical and social nature of  normative understanding, I will also borrow a condition 
Socrates thought definitive of  a techne. Understanding involves an ability to teach 
understanding to others (e.g., “Protagoras”).  19
 For an introduction, see (Hills 2009; and Sliwa 2017).18
 This account of  normative understanding is similar to Alison Hill’s (2009), modified for 19
expressivism.
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These conditions answer to the concern with social coordination that is supposed  to 
drive normative discourse. Without an ability to independently identify the normative 
status of  novel cases, my ability to successfully coordinate is limited to the familiar or 
when my guru is nearby. Social coordination obviously requires an ability to teach this 
skill to others; and long term social coordination requires an ability to teach others to 
teach... and so on. 
This account of  understanding further explains why the two deficiencies noted with 
the counterfactual versions of  (i) and (j) seem like deficiencies. To be unable to 
identify novel cases vitiates understanding, and the more sectional the principles, the 
narrower the circle of  people who can be taught to identify novel cases using them. 
With all this in place, we can say that (i) and (j) feel less than fully explanatory because 
they do not contribute to understanding to a sufficient degree. Explanations citing 
counterfactual versions of  the relevant principles are scarcely better. They only 
provide intelligible accounting and useful instruction to those very familiar with my 
mom or with Peanuts. Someone armed with these principles can teach their moral 
sensibility to only a very narrow range of  people. (Of  course, according to some 
virtue ethicists, true moral principles will have to be fairly sectional. But this is fine. It 
just means that there is a hard limit to how much understanding these explanations 
can provide.) 
With this notion of  understanding, we can also say something about philosophical 
normative explanations—about the sense in which they are potentially superior to 
everyday explanations, and about the explanatory ambitions of  traditional normative 
theory. Everyday explanations are in many ways superior for social coordination than 
those citing normative theories, which are simply too contentious. But philosophical 
explanations—it is wrong because it treats people as mere means, or because it fails 
to maximize happiness—aim to provide more understanding. Ideally, they provide a 
single exceptionless principle, and are thus easier to learn and to teach. They make 
predictions about the normative status of  all possible cases. They aim to state 
principles that are intelligible to and applicable by agents who lack our cultural and 
psychological idiosyncrasies. In these ways, they aim for a greater degree of  
understanding than everyday, ceteris paribus principles. 
Big picture moral theorizing should be seen as akin to certain projects of  legal 
codification, such as the Napoleonic Code or Model Penal Code—that is, it is a project 
of  codification that also aims to synthesize, simplify, and rationalize existing custom 
(legal in one case, normative in another), partly with aims of  increasing general 
intelligibility and regional uniformity. They promote understanding by reducing a 
mass of  low-level judgments and rules to a small number of  general principles, from 
which the status of  particular cases can be derived. Ideally these rules will be stated in 
terms whose application calls for minimal interpretation. 
The tie between explanation, understanding, and the aim of  social coordination also 
shows how the theory here could be adapted to handle particularist normative 
explanations. The theory here, which makes normative explanation a matter of  
subsumption to more general principles, is resolutely anti-particularist. I’m happy 
with this for the most part: moral particularism seems like an invitation to rampant 
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bias and special pleading (see McKeever and Ridge 2006: chapters 8 and 9). But I 
must admit, particularism about aesthetic values looks more plausible. I might tell you 
that Mad Max: Fury Road was awesome, partly for the guy playing a flame-throwing 
guitar from the back of  a war-rig. But this does not commit me to thinking that a 
flame-throwing guitar would contribute to the awesomeness of  all, or even most 
movies, or most normal movies, or movies under normal conditions, etc. 
If  aesthetic explanations truly are particularist in this way, then the purpose of  such 
explanations cannot be to identify more general principles. But explanations could 
still serve to promote understanding. The point of  citing flame-throwing guitars as an 
explanans isn’t to identify a prima-facie good-maker of  the cinematic, but rather to try to 
make certain features of  the movie psychologically salient to interlocutors.  We make 20
these features salient, in order produce a sort of  gestalt in others, so they share our 
reactions. (Though honestly, if  you have to point out the flame-throwing guitar, all is 
probably already lost.) But these explanations also aim at inculcating a certain 
aesthetic sensibility, so that the interlocutors can identify future good movies (or 
good movies of  the same genre, etc.) on their own. Finally, one models how to give 
these highly particularized explanations, so that interlocutors are better able to answer 
objections and teach the sensibility to others. Although if  explanations work like this, 
the intelligibility of  these answers may be much more highly constrained than in more 
principled normative domains. 
To summarize, a pragmatic notion of  understanding—as a kind of  discursive know 
how—follows naturally from normative discourse’s function of  promoting social 
coordination. By appealing to it, we can distinguish those normative ‘because’-claims 
that should seem genuinely explanatory from those that should feel merely evidential. 
By introducing pragmatic understanding we also gain resources to accommodate 
normative theories that are unprincipled, and so don’t conform to the basic picture 
offered here. 
4.3. Objections 
Before moving to the final task of  discussing how to handle claims such as ‘I believe 
lying is wrong because it is wrong’, I will address a few objections. 
The Unity of  ‘Because’. The proposal here is a nonstarter because it posits a distinctive 
meaning for the word ‘because’ when it occurs in normative contexts. This is exactly 
the sort of  thing that counts against the compositionality of  an expressivist 
semantics, and the sort of  solution expressivists are supposed to avoid (e.g., 
Schroeder 2008). 
But I have not proposed a distinctive normative meaning for ‘because’. It is the same 
sense of  ‘because’ as the one we use in mathematical explanation and in imperatival 
explanations. And while in general, yes, expressivists should try to make sure they 
aren’t positing ambiguity among terms to solve problems, we should note that there 
are multiple apparent senses of  ‘because’ whether one is an expressivist or not. There 
is a causal ‘because’, a ‘because’ of  grounding, a ‘because’ of  basing, an evidential 
 Compare with (Walden, op. loc. cit.).20
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‘because’, an imperatival and a mathematical ‘because’. I don’t doubt that advocates 
of  normative grounding will eventually be able to give us a unified account of  these 
seemingly different uses of  ‘because’. But there is no reason at present to suspect my 
account will be less hospitable to a unified theory.  21
This Is Just the D-N Model.  The account proposed here bears strong resemblance to 22
the Deductive-Nomological Model of  scientific explanations. On this account, 
explanations are deductive arguments, which explain their conclusion by showing 
how it follows from a general scientific law—which is one of  the premises—along 
with more particular circumstances. But the D-N Model was found defective in 
numerous respects. Why is this theory better? 
First, some of  the ways in which the D-N Model was found inadequate were specific 
to scientific explanation. Statistical explanations could not be assimilated to a kind of  
deductive argument, for example. But neither mathematical or purely normative 
explanations make use of  statistical explanations, so that objection does not apply. 
Another objection is that not all scientific explanations are arguments (Suppe 1989: 
174-5). But I haven’t made any claims about scientific explanations. Since some 
mathematical proofs are explanatory, there are explanations that are arguments. I 
propose that imperatival and normative explanations are arguments as well. 
Finally, there is the difficulty of  giving an informative characterization of  what a 
scientific law is (ibid.). There might be a similar difficulty in saying what a normative 
law is, but thankfully my account does not rest on normative laws. One standardly 
explains a normative fact by citing more general properties from which the moral 
status of  the more specific group follows, but no difference between the general 
claims that are laws and those that are mere generalizations is needed. As I’ve noted, 
real-life normative explanations frequently implicitly appeal to intermediate normative 
principles, which should be thought of  as helpful generalizations rather than laws. 
Euthyphro’s Revenge. In his influential (1987) paper, Michael DePaul asks us to consider 
the case of  the eighteenth-century moral philosopher, William Paley. Paley was both a 
utilitarian and a divine command theorist (1785/2002: book II). So, it would seem, he 
is committed to the following three claims. Necessarily, X is right if  and only if  X 
maximizes happiness. Necessarily, X is right if  and only if  God commands X. 
Necessarily, God commands X if  and only if  X maximizes happiness.  
Does my theory have the resources to let us say whether, on Paley’s view, God 
commands acts because they are right, or that they are right because God commands 
them? After all, both ‘X is right because it maximizes happiness’ and ‘X is right 
because God commands it’ should strike us as genuinely explanatory on my view, 
both potentially contribute to understanding. But being able to make sense of  the 
Euthyphro dilemma is one of  the central motives for introducing normative 
 There is no reason why the theory given here would not be compatible, for example, with van 21
Fraasen’s (1980, chapter 5) account of  the meaning of  ‘because’-claims.
 Thanks to Matt Lutz and Timothy Perrine for discussion on this point.22
 18
grounding. If  you can’t make sense of  that, you haven’t shown that normative 
grounding is dispensable.  23
First, I want to call attention to some philosophical bait-and-switch. Expressivists are 
told they must make sense of  the normative ‘because’, or else our theory is overly 
revisionary of  normative discourse. A theory is offered which accounts for 
explanation in ordinary normative discourse—and then it is objected that it fails to 
deliver verdicts in extremely arcane cases that it takes philosophical training to even 
formulate. Even if  this is so, the objection can no longer be that expressivism is 
unacceptably revisionary. Perhaps certain philosophical theories of  the normative are 
too strange, or more likely, too sparse, to support the kinds of  explanation claims their 
authors would want to make. But this is hardly a case of  rejecting a central part of  
the discourse. 
To be clear, it’s not that the Euthyphro dilemma itself  is too arcane. But it may have 
no answer within the stipulated, three-part normative theory just given. This theory 
insists that God commands what He commands necessarily. If  we accept that God 
commands contingently, then we can easily say God’s commands explain what is 
right, with the injunction to maximize happiness following from the more general 
injunction to do whatever God commands. 
And even if  God does necessarily command what he commands, we still would be 
able to say more, if  the theory had more detail. For purposes of  exposition I have 
been treating the Kantian principle as explanatory bedrock. But a Kantian would not 
regard it as so. Why is it wrong to treat people as mere means? Because, the Kantian 
will say, an act is wrong only if  every agent has decisive reason against it, regardless 
of  their contingent aims, and in order to act at all one must aim to treat humanity as 
an end in itself, so that this aim is not contingent. This is a further normative 
explanation, and on my account it further subsumes moral verdicts to more general 
normative principles of  rational action. Similarly, consequentialists, when they argue 
that the good is prior to the right, are subsuming our moral verdicts to a special case 
of  nonmoral evaluation, and subsuming our verdicts about actions to our verdicts 
about events more generally. 
If  we read Paley, this is exactly how he explains why it is God’s commands, rather 
than maximizing happiness, that is ultimately most explanatory. Paley writes: 
…[L]et it be asked, Why am I obliged to keep my word? and 
the answer will be, “Because I am urged to do so by a violent 
motive” (namely, the expectation of  being after this life 
rewarded, if  I do, or punished for it, if  I do not), “resulting 
from the command of  another” (namely, of  God). 
This solution goes to the bottom of  the subject, as no further 
question can reasonably be asked. 
Therefore, private happiness is our motive, and the will of  God 
our rule. 
 Thanks to Pekka Väyrynen for raising this objection.23
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(1785/2002: Book II, section 3) 
In other words, Paley explains the obligation to maximize happiness in terms of  
God’s commands in precisely the way I have argued he should, by subsuming moral 
injunctions to those of  self-interest. A special relation of  metaphysical dependence is 
not needed.  24
There is also an important lesson: overly simplified theories lack the structure 
necessary to support explanation. But, to emphasize again, the goal is to account for 
actual normative discourse. And that discourse is based on theories or sensibilities 
which are reasonably structured—as Paley’s theory turns out to be, when we turn to 
the details. 
5. Conclusion 
Human explanatory practice allows us to provide explanations that convey no 
information about objective determination relations. This is what the examples of  
imperatives and explanatory mathematical proofs show. The expressivist should argue 
that normative explanations are of  this kind as well. Typically they are a form of  
generalizing explanation, and always, when they seem genuinely explanatory, they 
provide information that answers to what expressivists regard as the central function 
of  normative discourse, information that both supports and allows participants to 
shape social coordination. This fits with the general expressivist project. We describe 
how normative explanatory speech acts function to communicate commitments, and 
then say this use exhausts what there is to say about normative explanation.  
There is an upshot to this as well. It allows for a genuinely metaphysical difference 
between quasi-realism and realism. Real properties figure in grounding relations. But 
the quasi-real is neither fundamental nor derivative: it stands outside the hierarchy of  
fundamentality. 
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